My research focuses mainly on issues pertaining to free will, moral responsibility, the badness of death, and time. Here are some papers that I have published on these issues, with links to the published version, where possible. For penultimate drafts (never behind a paywall), see my PhilPeople profile or my profile.


2. How Free Are We? Conversations from The Free Will Show (with Matthew T. Flummer). Oxford University Press, under contract.

1. Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer (co-edited with Andrew Law and Neal A. Tognazzini). Routledge, under contract.


23. “The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities,” Journal of Ethics, forthcoming.

22. “Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise,” Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming.

21. “What Time Travel Teaches Us About Moral Responsibility” (with Neal A. Tognazzini), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, forthcoming.

20. “The Inescapability of Moral Luck,” Thought 10, 2021: 302-310.

19. “Taking Hobart Seriously,” Philosophia 49, 2021: 1407–1426.

18. “Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: In Defense of Symmetrical Requirements,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2), 2021: 349-363.

17. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention” (with Andrew Law), American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2), 2020: 145-154.

16. “Timelessness and Freedom,” Synthese 197, 2020: 4439-4453.

15. “Atemporalism and Dependence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, 2020: 149-164.

14. “Manipulation and Constitutive Luck,” Philosophical Studies 177 (8), 2020: 2381-2394.

Reply by Alfred Mele: “Moral Responsibility and Manipulation: On a Novel Argument Against Historicism,” Philosophical Studies 177 (10), 2020: 3143–3154.

13. “Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1), 2020: 57-73.

12. “Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists,” Journal of Ethics 23 (4), 2019: 473-484.

11. “Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism,” Erkenntnis 84 (1), 2019: 193-214.

10. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability” (with Philip Swenson), Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1), 2019: 22-40.

9. “Carving a Life from Legacy: Free Will and Manipulation in Greg Egan’s ‘Reasons to Be Cheerful’,” Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1, 2018: 1-15.

8. “Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism” (with Matthew T. Flummer), International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (2), 2018: 183-199.

7. “Is Semicompatibilism Unstable?” Disputatio 9 (45), 2017: 245-264.

6. “Semicompatibilism: No Ability to Do Otherwise Required,” Philosophical Explorations 20 (3), 2017: 308-321.

5. “Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: A New Challenge to the Asymmetry Thesis,” Philosophical Studies 174 (12), 2017: 3153-3161.

Reply by David Palmer and Yuanyuan Liu: “Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected,” Erkenntnis 86 (5), 2021: 1225–1237.

4. “Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves,” Journal of Ethics 20 (4), 2016: 435-444.

3. “A Puzzle About Death’s Badness: Can Death Be Bad for the Paradise-Bound?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2), 2016: 145-162.

2. “The Parallel Manipulation Argument,” Ethics 126 (4), 2016: 1075-1089.

1. “Rationally Not Caring About Torture: A Reply to Johansson,” Journal of Ethics 18 (4), 2014: 331-339.

Reply by Duncan Purves: “Torture and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr,” Journal of Ethics 19 (2), 2015: 213-218.

Reply by Jens Johansson: “Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr,” Journal of Ethics 21 (2), 2017: 215-221.

Book Chapters

5. “Election and Human Agency” (with Leigh Vicens), in Edwin Chr. Van Driel (ed.), T&T Clark Companion to Election. T&T Clark, forthcoming.

4. “Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists,” in Leigh Vicens and Peter Furlong (eds.), New Essays on Theological Determinism. Cambridge University Press, 2022: 119-132.

3. “Free Will and (In)determinism in ‘Hang the DJ’,” in Amber Bowen and John Donne (eds.), Theology and Black Mirror. Fortress Press, 2022: 55-65.

2. “Prenatal and Posthumous Nonexistence: Lucretius on the Harmlessness of Death,” in Erin Dolgoy, Kimberly Hurd Hale, and Bruce Peabody (eds.), Political Theory on Death and Dying. Routledge, 2021: 111-120.

1. “How Does Death Harm the Deceased?” In John K. Davis, ed., Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments. Routledge, 2017: 29-46.

Book Reviews

2. Review of Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility, by Alfred R. MelePhilosophical Quarterly 70, 2019: 207-209.

1. Review of Causation and Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio, Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, 2018: 475-478.