Research

My research focuses mainly on issues pertaining to free will, moral responsibility, the badness of death, and time. Here are some papers that I have published on these issues, with links to the published version, where possible. For penultimate drafts (never behind a paywall), see my PhilPeople profile or my Academia.edu profile.

Articles

18. “Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: In Defense of Symmetrical Requirements,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

17. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention” (with Andrew Law), American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.

16. “Timelessness and Freedom,” Synthese, 197, 2020: 4439-4453.

15. “Atemporalism and Dependence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, 2020: 149-164.

14. “Manipulation and Constitutive Luck,” Philosophical Studies 177 (8), 2020: 2381-2394.

Reply by Alfred Mele: “Moral Responsibility and Manipulation: On a Novel Argument Against Historicism,” Philosophical Studies 177 (10), 2020: 3143–3154.

13. “Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1), 2020: 57-73.

12. “Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists,” Journal of Ethics 23 (4), 2019: 473-484.

11. “Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism,” Erkenntnis 84 (1), 2019: 193-214.

10. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability” (with Philip Swenson), Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1), 2019: 22-40.

9. “Carving a Life from Legacy: Free Will and Manipulation in Greg Egan’s ‘Reasons to Be Cheerful’,” Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1, 2018: 1-15.

8. “Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism” (with Matthew T. Flummer), International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (2), 2018: 183-199.

7. “Is Semicompatibilism Unstable?” Disputatio 9 (45), 2017: 245-264.

6. “Semicompatibilism: No Ability to Do Otherwise Required,” Philosophical Explorations 20 (3), 2017: 308-321.

5. “Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: A New Challenge to the Asymmetry Thesis,” Philosophical Studies 174 (12), 2017: 3153-3161.

Reply by David Palmer and Yuanyuan Liu: “Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected,” Erkenntnis, forthcoming.

4. “Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves,” Journal of Ethics 20 (4), 2016: 435-444.

3. “A Puzzle About Death’s Badness: Can Death Be Bad for the Paradise-Bound?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2), 2016: 145-162.

2. “The Parallel Manipulation Argument,” Ethics 126 (4), 2016: 1075-1089.

1. “Rationally Not Caring About Torture: A Reply to Johansson,” Journal of Ethics 18 (4), 2014: 331-339.

Reply by Duncan Purves: “Torture and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr,” Journal of Ethics 19 (2), 2015: 213-218.

Reply by Jens Johansson: “Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr,” Journal of Ethics 21 (2), 2017: 215-221.

Book Chapters

1. “How Does Death Harm the Deceased?” In John K. Davis, ed., Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments. Routledge, 2017: 29-46.

Book Reviews

2. Review of Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility, by Alfred R. MelePhilosophical Quarterly 70, 2019: 207-209.

1. Review of Causation and Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio, Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, 2018: 475-478.